Regulatory uncertainty often results in under-investment especially where there are high sunk costs in utilities such as electricity, gas and telecommunications. To ensure security of supply in these industries timely and socially optimal investment is of the essence. A new perspective is provided on the under-investment problem in the regulation of a firm with market power. We compare a political equilibrium based on a voting model with lobbying with a delegation equilibrium, where a government can delegate to a particular 'type' of pro-or anti-industry regulator. Our analysis suggests two possible and essentially equivalent ways in which we may observe price regulation that encourages socially optimal investment: first, there is less than total electoral transparency in which voters receive an optimal amount of information and second, the decisions on price are delegated to a sufficiently, but not excessively, pro-industry regulator.
Introduction
A long-standing problem in regulation is under-investment arising from the regulator's incentive to exploit the sunk cost nature of the regulated firm's capital investment. Public ownership, or at least the direct regulation of investment avoids the problem, but there is now a broad consensus that such institutional arrangements provide poor incentives for efficiency and innovation due in part to regulatory uncertainty (see for example Saphores et al 2004, Ishii and Yan 2004) . Rate of return regulation provides another possible solution, provided a commitment mechanism is in place that guarantees a 'fair rate of return'. Again such a 'low-powered' regulatory regime provides poor incentives to minimize cost, even if the fair rate guarantee can be made credible. By contrast, price regulation provides strong incentives for efficiency and, in this paper, we focus on this arrangement.
We examine the price regulation of a monopolist who can invest in period 1 in order to reduce network fixed costs in period 2. The efficiency of the firm is assumed to be observed so there is no adverse selection problem as, for example, in Laffont and Tirole (1993) .
The source of under-investment is the assumption that the regulator cannot commit to regulated prices over the two periods.
This paper provides a new perspective on this regulatory problem. First, we develop a political economy model of price regulation where firms make investment choices. In this model the regulator is the government and is well-informed. However, only a proportion of the voters know the government's position on regulation policy. The political equilibrium is based on the voting model with lobbying of Grossman and Helpman (1996) that uses a common agency framework to overcome some of the limitations of Median Voter applications, such as the difficulties they have in dealing with multi-dimensionality, interest groups and asymmetric information. Dixit (1996b) and Dixit et al. (1997) . For comments about these papers, see Rodrik (1995) , Faulhaber (1997b) , Besley and Coate (1997) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) .
Median Voter applications to regulation are: Baron (1988) analyzes the problem of a legislature that has to choose the weight of profits in the objective function of an imperfectly informed regulatory agency. Faulhaber (1997a and 1997b) analyzes the determination of cross-subsidies between different products. Beard and Thomson (1996) study the decision concerning two-part tariffs. Laffont (1996) also uses a similar majority voting approach. Polk and Schmutzler (2003) show that general lobbying is beneficial for all firms in the market, while private firm lobbying has a negative (or zero) impact on all except the Our second contribution to the literature proposes a solution to the under-investment problem that combines several features of the modern regulatory environment: government commitment to a particular regulator, the provision of independence to that regulator, and heterogeneity across regulators available. Thus in our set-up a government can appoint and credibly delegate to a particular type of regulator (or committee). Here a type refers to the preferences of the regulator being pro-industry (or anti-industry) in the sense of being pro-rent (or anti-rent) relative to those of the government. This solution to the under-investment problem is analogous to the idea, first proposed by Rogoff (1985) , of delegating monetary policy to independent central bankers who are 'conservative' in the sense of being more inflation-averse than the government. Spulber and Besanko (1992) , in the context of environmental regulation, used the idea of Rogoff-delegation to develop a model where a president is shown to make credible commitments to future agency actions by choosing an agency director whose preferences over consumer and firm interests differ from his own. The divergence between the president's preferences and those of the desired agency director are shown to depend on the agency's ability to make credible commitments and on whether the agency's regulatory action and the action of the regulated firm are profit substitutes or complements. 2 Our two approaches together show that if lobbying costs are negligible, the outcome obtained in a voting model with lobbying is equivalent to the outcome obtained with an independent regulator, for certain values of the proportion of informed voters and the 'type' of regulator. Some voter lack of information and a regulator with preferences relatively favourable to the firm's rent may provide assurances for a first-best level of investment, in the absence of regulatory commitment. The importance of these assurances to investors increase with the returns to investment and the discount factor. However, regulatory independence and poorly informed voters have a cost in terms of higher prices, which may outweigh the advantages of first best investment. A political equilibrium with lobbying has the additional drawback that political contributions further reduce the amount of resources available for investment.
This analysis suggests two potential mechanisms for alleviating the under-investment lobbying firm.
2 Spiller (1990) , Besley and Coate (2000) and Boyer and Laffont (1999) also stress the interactions between policy-makers preferences, delegation, voting behaviour and lobbying.
problem in the absence of regulatory commitment: first, voters receive just the amount of information that maximizes social welfare; and second, decisions on prices are delegated to a sufficiently, but not excessively, pro-industry regulator. These normative results also provide positive insights into observed regulatory structures. Separate regulatory authorities have been created in many countries in the recent past with considerable variation in their powers and profile. 3 Two possible roles are suggested for them here: a separate authority that provides voters with the 'right' amount of information (and then it is the politicians who actually fix the prices), or a fully independent regulator of the optimal 'type' to whom the government delegates price decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the related theoretical literature. Section 3 sets out the model. Section 4 derives a political equilibrium. Section 5 compares this with a delegation equilibrium. Section 6 deals with empirical issues and section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Theoretical Literature
First consider proposed ways of sustaining the commitment outcome as an equilibrium.
In a complete information context, Salant and Woroch (1992) , and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) (see also Newbery, 1999, chapter 2) show that outcomes close to first-best levels of investment can be sustained as a subgame-perfect trigger-strategy equilibrium. Unfortunately, there are well-known problems with this approach. First the length of the punishment phase (usually infinity) is arbitrary. There exists an infinite number of such equilibria, one for each length of punishment. Even if the two players can coordinate on the best of these equilibria, there is a second more serious problem: the equilibrium is not 'renegotiation-proof'. The players always have an incentive to renegotiate (i.e., recoordinate) after a deviation occurs, rather than carry out the punishment. This questions the credibility of trigger-strategy equilibria, even though they are sub-game perfect. 4 If we allow for asymmetric information in the form of incomplete information on the part of the firm regarding the type of regulator, then the existence of 'strong' regulators who like to commit opens the door to reputational equilibria which can sustain the levels of investment close to the first-best. This device is theoretically sound and in the simple models used in the literature including this paper its implementation poses no problems.
Theoretical considerations then leads us to conclude that ex ante commitment by a regulator to a future trajectory of prices is possible. However this ignores the benefits from allowing the regulator discretion. In a changing uncertain environment including the regulator's model of the firm, price trajectories must be designed for every conceivable state of the world. Regulators therefore need discretion to respond to changes in their perception of 'the model'. Policymakers are well aware of this, which is why they are generally reluctant to tie their hands. A further benefit of discretion in an incomplete information context is that policy actions provide the private sector with information about the type of policymaker (see Cowen et al, 2000) . This information may influence the regulated firm's desire to investment given the potential 'holdup problem' that investment by the firm signals to the regulator. Given the lack of regulatory commitment, the regulator may respond by inducing the firm to produce without rents (Dalen 2000) .
Our discussion suggests that we should narrow the area of interest to price regulation without commitment, so as to allow the regulator the discretion to respond to new circumstances and to new information. Besanko and Spulber (1992) , and the derivative paper Urbiztondo (1994) study this problem under the assumption that the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. They show that in a sequential equilibrium under-investment can be alleviated, at least for the efficient type of firm who is the recipient of informational rent. Laffont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11) arrive at a similar result in a model of regulatory capture where regulator and firm collude to send incorrect information back to the government.
Solutions to this regulatory problem that rely, indeed make a virtue of asymmetric information, still leave the question of what happens when regulators are well-informed about the firm and firms are prevented from colluding by regulatory procedures that are transparent to the government (though not necessarily to the electorate). This is the focus of our paper. 
The Model
There are two periods and full information on the part of the policy-maker. In the first period the price is given, and our focus is on alternative regulatory regimes in the second period. Two second-period regimes are compared: price regulation by either a governmentcontrolled regulator or by an independent regulator whose preferences can differ from those of the government. In this section we assume the former and formulate a political equilibrium.
In period 1 the firm, in anticipation of the regulated phase in period 2, spends resources to capture the policy platforms of two competing parties. A fixed proportion of voters are informed and vote for a party strictly on the basis of the effect of its policy on their utility. The rest of the voters are uninformed and their support for a party depends on the intensity of its campaign. This, in turn, depends on contributions from the lobby. As well as devoting resources to lobbying, the firm can invest in period 1 to lower costs in period 2. The details of the set-up are as follows.
The Firm
The regulated company is the only organized interest group or lobby in this economy.
It may spend resources with the aim of capturing the will of the public decision-makers, although it does not have a prior preference for any of the parties. In period t = 1, 2, the firm produces a quantity q t of a homogeneous good at total cost
where k are fixed costs in the first period, i is monetary investment in period 1 which leads to a lowering of fixed cost of f (i) in period 2. We assume f > 0, f < 0 and
The good is sold at a price p t = ψ(q t ) where ψ(·) is the inverse demand curve.
In period 1 with the regulated price p 1 and therefore quantity q 1 = ψ −1 (p 1 ) predetermined, the firm can also devote an amount s j ≥ 0, j = L, R to lobby the support of party j for its pricing policy p j 2 in period 2. The firm is risk neutral and in period 1 maximizes expected discounted second-period profits. Profits in periods t = 1, 2, taking into account political contributions, are given by
depending on whether party L or R is elected in period 2. Suppose first that the elected party has previously rejected the firm's lobby; then in period 2, given i, it chooses p 2 to maximize consumers' net surplus W (p 2 ), subject to the firm's second-period participation
The standard result of this optimization problem is that the constraint binds, so that U 2 (p 2 , i) = 0 which determines p 2 = p 2 (i) and output
Then, since there is no incentive to invest, we must have that i = 0 is chosen by the firm in period 1. This should be compared with the first-best investment outcome. Irrespective of the price regime which determines the distribution of benefits between the firm and consumer, the first-best investment must minimize discounted fixed costs −i + δf (i) at a level satisfying the first-order condition
where δ is the discount factor. Denote the first-best investment level by i = i F B . 6
The Voters
There are two types of voters: informed and uninformed. Informed voters, who are a proportion θ of the population, are agents who know and understand the parties' positions on regulatory policy. They derive utility
where W (p The parties cannot observe the ex ante proclivities of any particular voter, although they presume these to be drawn from a known cumulative distribution F (ω i ). In particular, the party bias is distributed according to a uniform distribution in the interval
where a reflects an a priori advantage for party L. Any one of these informed voters votes for party L or R taking into account the difference in the utility she derives from p L 2 and p R 2 and taking into account her a priori preferences for one of the parties. It follows from (4) that an informed voter prefers party
This defines the critical value ω as:
Then all informed voters with values of ω i < ω will vote for party L, and all the rest for party R. Thus the distribution function of ω i can be used as an explicit functional form for the proportion of voters that prefer party L. In particular, from the parties' point of view there is a probability
that the informed individual i will vote for party L. Thus the expected proportion of the electorate that is informed and votes for party L is θ
. Now consider uninformed voters, constituting a proportion (1 − θ) of the population, who do not know about the policy platforms of any of the parties. Let ω un , unknown to the parties, describe the ex ante preferences of an uninformed voter for party R before the electoral campaign. These individuals decide their votes according to the impression that they get from the intensity or quality of the electoral campaigns. In this sense, the electoral campaigns are not informative. The intensity/quality h j of party j's campaign depends on the firm's support to this party in the following form:
A typical uninformed voter derives utility
where we define the function ζ(·) by ζ (L) = 0 and ζ (R) = 1. As for the informed
Assuming ω un has the same distribution as ω i :
is the probability that the uninformed voters will vote for party L. Then the expected proportion of the voters that are uninformed and that vote for party L is (1−θ)
and depends on the difference in the parties campaigns, which in turn is determined by the difference in the support that the firm gives to the two parties.
The Parties and the Government
The Parliament is elected with proportional representation. Parties are assumed to carry out their electoral mandate. They have no ideological preferences and simply seek to maximize their vote share, or equivalently its representation in the Parliament, which with the maintained assumptions for party L is:
and for party R is P R = 1 − P L , given the nature of the two party system. The firm anticipates that the legislature adopts the regulatory policy p L with probability ν(P L ) and the regulatory policy p R with probability 1 − ν P L . The ex ante, two-period objective function of the firm now becomes
We make the following assumptions about ν P L :
Properties 1) and 2) are obvious requirements, while 3) and 4) ensure that ν can be interpreted as a probability. 7 We interpret (9) as the electoral support for the regulation policy of party L. Since ν (P L ) > 0, (9) says that incumbent L party has an advantage (a > 0), and raising the consumer surplus of informed voters under policy L relative to R (the second term) and the relative lobbying of L (the third term) increases the chances of winning. The constant d > 0 and the constant b > 0, introduced in (4) and (7) make all terms in (9) dimensionless.
7 ν introduces some noise in the implementation process of the policy platform. It could alternatively be assumed that ν = 1 if P L > P R , without any noise and the qualitative results would not change.
The Political Equilibrium
The timing of events is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period 1, given the regulated price p 1 the firm chooses output
The firm offers contracts (s
3. The parties independently accept or refuse offers.
4. The firm chooses investment i.
5. The election takes place.
6. At the beginning of period 2, the legislature either implements p 2 = p j 2 with proba- Figure 1 shows the extensive form of the game. In this dynamic game of full information, the appropriate equilibrium concept is a subgame perfect equilibrium found by backward induction starting at stage 6:
The regulator implements p j 2 for party j = L, R resulting in profits
If the contract was turned down by the winning party, then U 2 (p 2 (i), i) = 0 with p 2 = p 2 (i).
Stage 5.
The election takes place which the incumbent L party wins with probability ν(P L ) where P L is given by (9).
Stage 4.
If neither party has signed a contract, the firm anticipates that profits will be zero whatever investment is made. Hence i = 0 in this case. In the political equilibrium we will show that a contract is either signed with both parties, or only with the incumbent L party. If a contract is only signed with the L party, investment is chosen to maximize
Using (11) and the fact that P L is independent of investment i (which turns out to be consistent with the equilibrium -see stage 2, below), the first order conditions for this optimization can be written
but this is a local maximum. Investment results in a lower regulated price and it may be better for the firm to choose zero investment. In choosing whether to offer the party a political contract, the firm will anticipate the incentives this creates for investment. It will offer a contract p j 2 with investment i = i L iff this is preferable to no contract with zero investment (in which case p 2 = p 2 (0) = p * 2 , say, recalling that p 2 (i) is the price at which
If a contract is signed with the R party as well, investment is chosen to maximize
Again using (11), the first order conditions for this optimization can be written
resulting in investment i = i R > i L , say. Analogous to (13) is the following condition for
Stage 3.
Party L always has the option of refusing the lobby's offer and then implementing the price p * 2 . Then from (9) it captures the share of votes
It follows that if the firm wants to affect the regulated price, it needs to provide the L party with sufficient funds to obtain votes P L > P * . A similar argument applies to party R. Using (9), (16) and its counterpart for the R party, the condition for party to accept the contract is:
Stage 2.
The firm chooses (s j , p j 2 ) to maximize Θ given by (10), subject to (17) . The latter con-
where from (9)
, if the marginal benefit from the first dollar of extra contribution to L is not higher than its marginal cost. Similarly (17) binds for j=R if
If party L is the more popular party (a > 0), it follows that P L > P R . Therefore since examine equilibria for which bν (P j ) is sufficiently small so as (18) and therefore (19) hold.
Then (17) holds with equality and from (16) P L = 1 2 + a, i.e., P L is independent of s j and investment which we have already assumed in the investment decision at stage 4.
There is one more condition to consider. The firm will only offer a contract (s j , p j ) if, in conjunction with anticipated investment, it improves intertemporal rent. The condition for this is
where
2 ) for j = R. Then using (17) with equality, the optimal contract for the firm to offer to party j implements a price p 2 = p j 2 to maximize:
The first order condition for the unconstrained optimization problem is
Using the fact that the net consumer surplus is given by
Using this result and
becomes
where L j is the Lerner index for party j and η(p
is the elasticity of demand.
Assume that the elasticity of demand is a constant denoted by η. We can now characterize the regulated price and the choice of investment by the firm in a political equilibrium.
We can now identify three equilibria depending on the proportion of informed voters:
, provided the price is sufficiently high that the condition (13) holds, in which case investment is positive but below the first-best.
This equilibrium exists ifθ R <θ L . From (24) this condition means (25) may not hold, for example as ν L approaches ν R . Then the B equilibrium does not exist. Otherwise i = i L or i = 0, depending on the conditions given for type B. As the proportion θ of informed voters becomes small, the regulated price rises which outweighs any welfare gain to the consumer from higher investment. We summarize these results in the following proposition. (23) is linear. Then price-contracts are given by p j /c = ν j φ for j = L, R for the two parties. 8 At φ = A, 8 For η > 1, the price-marginal cost curves are concave and are bounded above by the monopoly value However at φ = A, the L-price is too low for i = i L to be preferable to i = 0, and it is not until a higher value of φ (and a lower θ) at φ = A that condition (13) R prices are rising and consumer surplus is falling. Eventually φ will reach a threshold at which the average price over the L and P parties exceeds p * 2 and then disinformation is counterproductive for the consumer. This point is pursued further in the welfare analysis of the next section. 9 Note that by differentiating δν
Type C (poorly-informed voters
): θ ∈ (0,θ R ]. Then U L , s L > 0; U R ,
Proposition 1

There are three possible equilibria, depending on how well-informed are the voters. In equilibrium A, a well-informed democracy, there are no lobbies and parties choose the regulated price to maximize consumer surplus. Rent is forced to zero and no investment occurs. In equilibrium B with a moderately informed electorate, only the incumbent party is lobbied resulting in a higher regulated price and positive rent if that party is elected. Investment can now be positive, but is below the first-best. In equilibrium C with a poorly informed electorate, the opposition is also lobbied and implements a regulated price with positive rent, though both are less than that offered by the incumbent. Investment can now reach its first-best.
] with respect to φ we find that this curve is concave in (p/c, φ) space and cuts the p = p j 2 at a turning point, as shown in the figure
Rogoff-Delegation to an Independent Regulator
Now suppose that voters are well-informed (i.e., θ = 1) so no lobbying takes place. In this well-functioning democracy there is under-investment unless the government is able to commit to its regulated price before investment is made. But if no such commitment mechanism is in place, can the under-investment problem be solved? A possible solution is provided by Rogoff-delegation, a second-best commitment mechanism in which the pricing decision is delegated to an independent regulator whose preferences do not necessarily coincide with those of the government. 10 The significance of the independence of the regulator is that the choice of regulator and their decisions cannot be over-ruled after the sunk investment has been made by the firm.
The timing of events for the delegation game is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period 1 the price is predetermined by the previous regime and the firm chooses output q 1 = ψ −1 (p 1 ).
2. The firm government delegates price regulation to an independent regulator with objective function:
in period 2, where α ≥ 1 measures the extent to which the regulator is pro-industry.
In the previous political equilibrium if the voters are well-informed, the government responds by maximizing (26) with α = 0. If voters own the regulated firm then a utilitarian social welfare with α = 1 would be chosen.
The firm chooses investment i.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the regulator chooses p 2 to maximize (26) .
Solving for a subgame perfect equilibrium, at stage 4 the independent regulator solves the problem:
10 Rogoff-delegation has been proposed in the environmental regulation context by Spulber and Besanko 
The solution to this problem follows as for stage 2 of the political equilibrium. The unconstrained optimization problem leads to a Lerner index
As before assume a constant elasticity η(p 2 ) = η. Then the regulated price which we refer to as the Lerner price is given by
if the second-period participation constraint does not bind (i.e., U 2 (p L 2 , i) > 0). It should be noted that p L 2 is independent of investment. If the constraint does bind then the regulated price is a function of investment p 2 = p 2 (i) where
, the case of a representative regulator. But as α increases, eventually the Lerner price in (29) is high enough to give non-negative rent at some threshold value α =α(i) > 1. figure 4) . Using (29) this givesα
Since L ∈ [0, (29) . This increases with α, which increases the rent. Now an incentive to invest may exist. If the firm does choose to invest it will achieve a maximum of the 2-period rents
However the firm may also choose not to invest. Given the regulated second-period price, i = i F B is preferable to i = 0 only if the regulated price p L 2 is sufficiently high to ensure that 
This occurs when α > α >α, say where α >α (see figure 4) . 
,ᾱ], p 2 rises until the rent in period 2 is sufficient to satisfy condition (32) and induce the optimal level of investment. If α increases to a value high enough such
0), 0) = 0 and second-period participation constraint following no investment ceases to bind. This occurs at α = a >α in figure 4.
In figure 5 , if the government inadvertently chooses a more pro-industry regulator, the regulated price rises and consumer surplus falls until at a another thresholdα, for α >α 11 Functional forms and parameter values are: Finally we note an exact equivalence between the political and delegation equilibria for the case where the incumbent party has no advantage.
and the same contract is signed with both parties. By equating (22) and (28) 
Empirical Implications
In this section, we present the empirical implications of the model and relate them to the recent empirical literature.
The theoretical results for a political equilibrium where a proportion of voters are uninformed and the regulator is in effect the government, and a delegation equilibrium where the regulator is independent, have the following empirical implications: first, commitment, rationed information and regulatory independence are substitutes. 12 In the presence of sunk costs that must be covered by regulated prices, the ability of both the regulator and the 12 The idea of substitutability between commitment and rational ignorance has also been put forward by Faure-Grimaud (1999). In his model, the regulator prefers to commit to not setting up a monitoring structure and instead rely on noisy information provided by the stock market.
firm to commit to future policies delivers first best price and investment. Commitment in utilities regulation may be achieved through constitutional constraints(or by very detailed legislation, as in Chile) or through the development of a judicial tradition, such as the 'fair' rate of return tradition in the U.S. The theoretical literature reviewed in the introduction suggests that the commitment outcome may be sustained as either trigger strategy or 'reputational' equilibrium even in the absence of these constraints. However there are logical problems with these equilibria. Then under-investment may be alleviated through an optimal degree of voters' information or through regulatory independence. Regulatory independence may deliver higher welfare than the information mechanism (which depends on wasteful rent-seeking activities). However, it is our conjecture that in some countries independence may not be credible or sustainable (see Guasch and Spiller, 1999, and Noll, 1999) , and hence the relevance of the "voters' information" case.
Second, in the absence of commitment, capture or regulatory independence become more necessary to alleviate under-investment the larger the returns to investment and the higher the discount factor. If the investment in regulated sectors is crucial for the development of a country, some mechanism to alleviate under-investment becomes necessary. On the contrary, if the country already has a high level of physical infrastructure, the mechanisms to alleviate under-investment become less important. Moreover, when agents attach a high value to the future (due to political stability or to low interest rates, for example) the welfare-enhancing properties of the information mechanism or regulatory independence become more evident.
The institutional mix in every country develops endogenously depending on more primitive political and economic parameters. The model presented lays the preliminary theoretical foundations of a research agenda that makes more precise the idea that effective regulation depends on the institutional endowment of each country (see Levy and Spiller, 1996) . The role of the judiciary, the use of contracts, the existence of checks and balances, the reputation of the civil service, the administrative procedures and the importance of informal norms and institutions have also been suggested as possible contributors to alleviate the under-investment problem.
Relationship with the Empirical Literature
There is a growing number of empirical studies that consider the outcome of different types of regulators in different industries and countries. The common characteristics of regulators that produce first best results are that the regulatory environment encourages commitment 13 and allows the investor to be fully compensated for the opportunity cost of their investment. 14 Wallsten (1999) and Bortolotti el al. (1998) quantify the effects of a separate regulatory authority in a cross-section of countries. However, they acknowledge that the lack of detail in their measure of institutional characteristics is an important limitation of their conclusions. Wallsten concludes that privatization combined with a separate regulatory authority (which is interpreted as signalling a move towards regulatory reform and is measured as a dummy variable that does not distinguish between independent separate authorities and non-independent separate authorities) has a significantly positive effect on network expansion and labour productivity in telecommunications. Bortolotti et al find that regulatory independence in electricity (measured as a dummy variable that can take only two extreme values), when included in an index of regulatory certainty together with access regulation and the existence of a wholesale market, has a positive effect on privatization revenues, as capturing a reduction in regulatory risk.
The effectiveness of firm lobbying in the cellular industry of the US is tested by Duso (2001) . He shows that where regulation took place, there was no significant reduction in phone tariffs due to the success of firms lobbying activities as they were able to avoid regulation in those markets where it would have been most effective. He concludes that price regulation was more likely when the regulator was elected by politicians, when the state's governor was a republican, when the government was politically stable and when the regulation's opportunity costs were low. Henisz and Zelner (2001) use an index of political commitment which has a positively significant effect on network deployment. Their index is not specific to the regulated 13 Dijkstra (2002) studies the environmental policy of a polluting firm that can invest in extra capacity and finds that the government can obtain welfare optimum under commitment with divisible investment.
With time consistent policy the social optimum is no longer possible as the firm over invests with direct regulation so as to achieve more output and under invests with taxation so as to achieve a lower tax rate.
14 Pindyck (2004) describes the disincentives to invest in broadband technology caused by the network sharing arrangements required by the Telecoms Act 1996 in the US.
network sectors, although they use it to test the hypothesis for the telecommunications industry. Consequently, they admit that a more detailed study of the regulatory institutions is warranted. In subsequent work Henisz (2002) They also show that investment is higher in states that appoint the regulator. Although this study does not deal with the issue of regulator independence and its validity is limited to the US case, it shows the potential of empirically testing the effect of institutional choices on prices and investment. In common with our approach, they also stress the effect of voters' information on lobbying and policy determination.
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), using an OECD database, pioneered the use of factor analysis techniques to group countries according to their policy and market environments in telecommunications. However, they only use data referred to liberalization and privatization, and do not introduce data on the details of regulatory governance to compute the indices. They then find positive effects of liberalization on economic outcomes and non-significant effects of privatization. Roller and Duso (2001) , using the same data base, suggest that econometric exercises that look at the effects of regulatory variables may be misleading if the endogeneity of regulatory choices is not properly taken into account.
They suggest the use of political variables as instruments for these regulatory decisions, along the lines of Case (2000, 2003) . In common with the insights provided by this paper, both the measurement and the determinants of regulatory institutions appear to be a key issue in the next generation of empirical studies in regulatory reform.
Holburn and Spiller (2002) use a panel data set of rate reviews of the US electric utilities to determine the impact of consumer advocates and Public Utility Commissioners on regulatory policy and utility strategy. Elected commissioners and consumer advocates were found to stave off rate reviews and grant lower returns on equity. A later study using a panel data set also from the US electric industry by Guerriero (2003) analyzes the degree of judical accountability and outcomes of a regulated industry. He finds that states where judges are elected have lower electricity prices as they are less likely to pass through cost changes into prices. These findings are explained in terms of property rights inspiring confidence in the firms to invest.
Although the empirical evidence is relatively limited (especially when compared to the literature on Central Bank Independence, 15 the general conclusion is that isolating regulators from political pressures can have a positive effect on private investment, 16 which is consistent with the delegation model presented above. More research is needed on the political sustainability of such delegation and on the details of complementary or alternative governance arrangements.
Conclusions
We have compared two settings, one with a politically constrained regulator and one with an independent 'pro-industry' regulator, and shown that there is an equivalence among them, given that the 'right' type of regulator can be found and that there is the 'right' under-investment problem in the absence of regulatory commitment can be alleviated. In both cases, political constraints and regulatory independence, the price to be paid for reestablishing first best investment may be a higher price than the first best and high rents for the regulated firm. The strategic value of keeping a fraction of voters uninformed and of appointing a pro-industry regulator increases with the returns to investment and with the discount factor.
Our results throw some light on how a regulatory regime might achieve effective regulation whether through government-dependent or independent regulators. Effective regulation must achieve: first, socially optimal levels of both investment and effort. This latter rules out direct controls or 'rate of return' regulation. Second, the consumer should benefit from higher investment through lower prices. Our paper shows that with discretion, a government-dependent regulator that provides the public with just the right amount of information, or delegation to an independent regulator of just the right type will achieve first best investment at possibly some cost in terms of prices.
This in a sense is a positive rather than normative result. To derive normative conclusions we note that we have relocated the problem as one of choosing the correct amount of political transparency or the correct type of regulator. The latter problem seems easier to solve. As we have argued regulators have track records. New regulators should be aware of the problem posed in our model and be prepared to build up a reputation for achieving the 'right balance between the needs of consumers and the firm' (i.e., a reputation for having the right α). One could see this process in terms of 'as if' Rogoff-delegation rather than the literal interpretation of choosing the right type. Some formal modelling of the process by which regulators acquire reputation might be worthwhile in future work.
The setting presented here has focused on very stylized regulatory characteristics. We have studied regulation under complete information, but our delegation approach is also appropriate where the firm possesses asymmetric information. Then even without the investment issue, delegation can alleviate the 'ratchet effect' (see Currie et al,1999) ; with investment delegation addresses both the ratchet effect and the under-investment problem (see Levine and Rickman, 2001 
